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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

Case No. 890327-CA

v.
CARLOS REINALDO SAMPSON,

Category No. 2

Defendant-Respondent.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Two issues are presented in this petition for
rehearing:
1.

Did this Court overlook pertinent decisions of the

United States Supreme Court and numerous lower courts in
concluding that defendant's confession, which was obtained by
police after defendant had validly waived his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was rendered
inadmissible by a prior Miranda violation?
2.

Did this Court overlook pertinent decisions of the

United States Supreme Court and numerous lower courts in
suggesting, without analysis, that the victim's body was
inadmissible because it was discovered as a result of statements
and acts of defendant that were obtained in violation of Miranda?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree,
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 76-5-203
(Supp. 1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 74-76)-

Defendant filed

a motion to suppress the statements taken from him by the police,
and that motion was denied on August 28, 1987 (R. 169-91).
Defendant was tried by jury in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable David
S. Young, district judge, presiding, and was found guilty as
charged (R. at 253-62).

Judge Young sentenced defendant to a

term in the Utah State Prison of not less than five years and
which may be for life (R. at 329).
On appeal, this Court reversed and remanded the case on
the issue of the suppression of defendant's statements.

State v.

Sampson, No. 890327-CA (Utah Ct. App. Sep. 11, 1990) (a copy of
the opinion is attached in the Addendum).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A complete statement of the facts is contained in the
State's responsive brief.

The facts pertinent to this petition

for rehearing are that defendant was given the Miranda warnings
by Sergeant Syd Elliott at the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office
before administering a polygraph examination (R. 360 at 337-38).
When the warnings were given, defendant questioned whether he
should have a lawyer, but then said he was not really worried (R.
at 120). Sergeant Elliott then administered the test and
determined that defendant was being untruthful when he said that
he did not know where the victim was (R. at 141).

With the results of the polygraph, Sheriff N. D.
Hayward questioned defendant about the location of the victim (R.
360 at 428). Defendant eventually told Sheriff Hayward that his
child was dead, then took the sheriff and other officers to the
body (R. 360 at 428-30).

While enroute, defendant was not

questioned but volunteered that he thought that the child had
died of a respiratory disease (R. 360 at 444).
After the victim's body was recovered, defendant was
placed under arrest and returned to the Metropolitan Hall of
Justice in Salt Lake City (R. 365 at 80-81).

At the Hall of

Justice, Detective Richard Judd gave defendant the Miranda
warnings and defendant, without hesitation, signed a waiver form
and agreed to talk with the detectives (R. 361 at 505).
Detective Judd interrogated defendant, who admitted that he had
struck the child too hard and caused her death (R. 362 at 63650).

Defendant also told Detective Jerry Thompson that the child

had fallen after defendant had "knocked her silly" (R. 361 at
470-78).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although defendant's pre-arrest statements and acts may
have been obtained in violation of Miranda, that violation did
not invalidate his subsequent confession obtained after proper
Miranda warnings and a valid waiver by defendant of his rights
under Miranda.

Because defendant's pre-arrest statements and

acts were not compelled in violation of the fifth amendment, his
post-arrest confession, which was obtained after proper Miranda
warnings and a valid waiver, was admissible.

The body of the victim, which was physical evidence
acquired after the alleged Miranda violation, was admissible in
spite of the violation.

While defendant's statements and

testimonial acts which led the police to the body were excludable
under Miranda, the physical evidence discovered as a result of
those statements and acts was properly admitted.
INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g, 4 Utah 292, 11 P.
512 (1886), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard for
determining whether a petition for rehearing should be granted:
To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be
made. We must be convinced that the court
failed to consider some material point in the
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or
that some matter has been discovered which
was unknown at the time of the hearing.
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted).

In Cumminqs v.

Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Court stated:
To make an application for a rehearing is a
matter of right, and we have no desire to
discourage the practice of filing petitions
for rehearings in proper cases. When this
court, however, has considered and decided
all of the material questions involved in a
case, a rehearing should not be applied for,
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked
some material fact or facts, or have
overlooked some statute or decision which may
affect the result, or that we have based the
decision on some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked
something which materially affects the result
. . . . If there are some reasons, however,
such as we have indicated above, or other
good reasons, a petition for a rehearing
should be promptly filed and, if it is
meritorious, its form will in no case be
scrutinized by this court.

42 Utah at 172-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this
brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and
should be granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
MIRANDA, ABSENT SOME CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH
VIOLATES THE FIFTH AMENDMENT DIRECTLY, DOES
NOT TAINT A SUBSEQUENT CONFESSION WHICH WAS
OBTAINED IN CONFORMANCE WITH MIRANDA.
As this Court noted in its opinion, the State did not
address the Miranda waiver issue on appeal, choosing instead to
focus on the noncustodial aspect of the questioning at the time
of the polygraph examination and prior to defendant's arrest.
Sampson, slip op. at 15.

For purposes of further review, the

State does not concede that the interrogation was custodial;
however, on petition for rehearing, the State presents the
following argument on the waiver issue.
This Court, in footnote 14 of its opinion, apparently
believed the State did not think that "the second set of Miranda
warnings are of any consequence to [the Court's] analysis."

The

Court then applied Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), in
concluding that defendant's post-arrest confession, obtained
after a second set of Miranda warnings and a valid waiver, must
also be suppressed.

This conclusion reflects a misapprehension

of the law.
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the United
States Supreme Court addressed the issue of the admissibility of

the defendant's second statement, after proper Miranda warnings,
which followed his prior, unwarned statement.

The Elstad case

required the Court
to decide whether an initial failure of law
enforcement officers to administer the
warnings required by Miranda . . ., without
more, "taints" subsequent admissions made
after a suspect has been fully advised of and
has waived his Miranda rights.
470 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted).

Elstad had made unwarned

statements to the police, then was taken to the police station
where he was advised of his Miranda rights.

His subsequent

statements were admitted although the trial court suppressed the
earlier, unwarned statements.

470 U.S. at 301-302.

The Court reiterated that the Miranda warnings are
"'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are]
instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination [is] protected.'"

470 U.S. at 305 (quoting

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).

The Court then

compared this circumstance with the exclusionary rule enforced
for violations of the fourth amendment, i.e., illegal arrests or
searches.

The exclusionary rule is enforced for constitutional

violations; a Miranda violation is not necessarily a fifth
amendment violation.

The Court said:

The Miranda exclusionary rule, however,
serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more
broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It
may be triggered even in the absence of a
Fifth Amendment violation. The Fifth
Amendment prohibits use by the prosecution in
its case in chief only of compelled
testimony. Failure to administer Miranda
warnings creates a presumption of compulsion.

But the Miranda presumption, though
irrebuttable for purposes of the
prosecution's case in chief, does not require
that the statements and their fruits be
discarded as inherently tainted.
4 70 U.S. at 306-307 (emphasis in original).

Thus, voluntary

statements taken in violation of Miranda may still be used £i
impeachment purposes, for example

4 70 U.S. at

?

(citing

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
Elstad contended that his warned statements w^re "fruit
of Hie poisonous tree,." and thus should be suppressed under Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).

The Court rejected

this contention, stating:
The Court [in Michigan v. Tucker] concluded
that the unwarned questioning "did not
abridge respondent's constitutional privilege
. . . but departed only from the prophylactic
standards later laid down by this Court in
Miranda to safeguard that privilege."
470 U.S. cif "*0 8 (quoting Tucker, 4.1/ U.S. at 446)).

Because

"'policemen investigating serious crimes [cannot realistically be
expected rcj make no errors whatsoever[f }'" a violation of
Miranda should not be treated the same as a fifth amendment
violation,

4 70 U.S. at 308. •

11 errors are made by law enforcement
officers in administering the prophylactic
Miranda procedures, they should not breed the
same irremediable consequences as police
infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.
It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to
hold that a simple failure to administer the
warnings, unaccompanied by any actual
coercion or other circumstances calculated to
undermine the suspect's ability to exercise
his free will, so taints the investigatory
process that a subsequent voluntary and
informed waiver is ineffective for some
indeterminate period. Though Miranda
requires that the unwarned admission must be

suppressed, the admissibility of any
subsequent statement should turn in these
circumstances solely on whether it is
knowingly and voluntarily made.
470 U.S. at 309.
Having determined that a Miranda violation, without any
accompanying compulsion, is not a constitutional violation, the
Court held that the Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine did not apply.

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305, 310.

Nor did a

Miranda violation fall within the doctrine that a prior statement
had "let the cat out of the bag."
U.S. 532 (1947).

United States v. Bayer, 331

In Bayer, the Court had said:

[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out
of the bag by confessing, no matter what the
inducement, he is never thereafter free of
the psychological and practical disadvantages
of having confessed. . . .
In such a sense,
a later confession may always be looked upon
as fruit of the first. But this Court has
never gone so far as to hold that making a
confession under circumstances which preclude
its use, perpetually disables the confessor
from making a usable one after those
conditions have been removed.
331 U.S. at 540-41.

Based on this precedent, the Elstad Court

stated:
This Court has never held that the
psychological impact of voluntary disclosure
of a guilty secret qualifies as state
compulsion or compromises the voluntariness
of a subsequent informed waiver.

We must conclude that, absent deliberately
coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the
initial statement, the mere fact that a
suspect has made an unwarned admission does
not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A
subsequent administration of Miranda warnings
to a suspect who has given a voluntary but
unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice

to remove the conditions that precluded
admission of the earlier statement,
4 T) n s. c3t < l ::, M «
;
i
The Utah Supreme Court, quoting Elstad, has agreed with
this principle.

In State v. Bishop, 7 53 P. 2d 43 9, 4 h 5-fib iiil.ih

1988), the Court applied the Elstad principle in determining that
Bishop's post-Miranda statements were admissible because they
"were not the product of coercion or duress, but were voluntarily
made."

75 3 P. 2d at 466,

The post-Miranda statements were not

tainted by prior unwarned statements
that

The Coi irt even deter m I i led

although the unwarned statements should have been

suppressed, their admission was harmless error.

I i

Elstad differs from the present case i r. - -.at Elstad was
not given Miranda warnings; here, this Court has determined that
defendant was given the warnings and equivocally refer ret I to his
a right

to have counsel present.

This Court, with no analysis of

Elstad, determined that "an equivocal reference to counsel" is
governed by Edwards v. Arizona an*I further' police questioning
could not occur unless defendant initiated the contact.
slip op, at
reference to c

. - and 18 n.17.

Sampson,

However, whether an equivocal

ocation of the right to counsel

under Miranda was not the issue in Edwards.

in that case, the

United States Supreme Court said:
We further hold that an accused , , , having
expressed his desire to deal with the police
only through counsel, is not subject to
further interrogation by the authorities
until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations
with the police.

We . . . emphasize that it is inconsistent
with Miranda and its progeny for the
authorities, at their instance, to
reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has
clearly asserted his right to counsel
451 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasis added).

In short, contrary to the

apparent view of this Court, Edwards did not address, and
therefore does not govern, the situation where the suspect makes
an equivocal request for or reference to counsel.

Indeed, in a

footnote, the Edwards Court strongly suggested that the rule of
that case does not apply in the equivocal request situation.
U.S. at 486 n.9.

451

After citing decisions of the federal circuit

courts of appeals which have held that "a valid waiver of an
accused's previously invoked Fifth Amendment right to counsel is
possible," and specifically noting the rule of the Fifth Circuit,
which is the rule adopted in Edwards, the Court said, "Waiver is
possible . . . when the request for counsel is equivocal."

Id.

(citing Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc);
Thompson v. Wainwriqht, 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979)).
By implication, this Court reached a similar conclusion
in State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), where it
held that "when an accused makes an arguably equivocal request
for counsel during custodial interrogation, further questioning
must be limited to clarifying the request."

754 P.2d at 969.

In

so holding, the Court implicitly recognized that an equivocal
request for counsel is treated differently than a clear assertion
of the right to have counsel present, in that further
questioning, albeit limited, may occur after the equivocal

request—something Edwards forbids after a clear assertion of the
right to counsel.

If an equivocal request were treated as a

clear assertion. • ' :• i.jht,

m

l «K: i f i :a I ion *i 'he equivocal request

through additional interrogation would violate Edwards.
Thus, the issue presented in the instant case is
whether defendant's equivocal reference to counsel

during the

polygraph examination, which this Court determined was not
clarified by the officers as requi red by Griffin, Sampson, siip
op. at 20, Is tantamount to an invocation of the right to have
counsel present, such that, as this Court concluded, "the timts
of [defendant's] post-arrest

.errogations must also be

suppressed [under Edwards v. Arizona]," id. at 14 n .14.

This

issue '. s properly resolved in a manner contrary ! - 1 l.e Court's
conclusion under the analysis followed by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918 (11th CIr.
1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986), modified in unrelated
part, 781 F.2d 185 (11th Cir. 1986).
In Martin, the court found that Martin's question,
"Can t wfL* wait until tomorrow," during police interrogation on
July 4, was an equivocal request to cut off questioning.
F.2d at 923.

7 70

Such a request must he rreated similarly to an

equivocal request for an attorney, i.e., further questioning must
be limited to clarifying the request

7 7 0 F.2d at 924.

Because

the officers did not. clarify the equi\ oca 1 request, the

The state will hereafter refer to defendant's statement to
Sergeant Elliott regarding counsel as an "equivocal reference to
counsel," in accordance with this Court's suggestion that it be
characterized as such. Sampson, slip op, at 16 n.l 5.

confession made by Martin on July 4 was inadmissible because it
was obtained in violation of Miranda.

770 F.2d at 928. The

analysis did not end there, however, as the court then analyzed
whether the July 4 confession rendered inadmissible a subsequent
confession obtained in compliance with Miranda.
The court first determined that the July 4 confession,
though inadmissible under Miranda, was voluntary under the fifth
amendment.

Having determined that the confession was voluntary,

the court applied Elstad to determine if a subsequent confession
on July 11 was admissible.

The later confession was obtained

after Martin had validly waived his Miranda rights.
930.

770 F.2d at

Because the July 4 confession was voluntary, the July 11

confession was admissible.

770 F.2d at 929.

Following Elstad,

the court found the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine
inapplicable.

It stated:

The instant case differs from Elstad in
that it involves a failure to honor the
suspect's request to "cut off" questioning
rather than a failure to give Miranda
warnings. Nevertheless, the same reasoning
necessarily applies. As explained in the
preceding subsection, Martin's July 4
confession was voluntary. As in Elstad, the
police here violated the technical
requirements of Miranda, but did not violate
the Fifth Amendment itself. The absence of
"actual coercion" in connection with the July
4 interrogation renders the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine inapplicable, and we
hold that the July 4 Miranda violation does
not automatically require the exclusion of
the July 11 confession on this ground.
770 F.2d at 928 (emphasis in original).

See also Elledge v.

Duqqer, 823 F.2d 1439, 1443 (11th Cir. 1987) (not honoring a
request to stop questioning is the same as failing to give the

Miranda warnings; both are technical violations of Miranda, but
neither violate the fifth amendment).
Nor was the "cat out of the bag" rule applicable.
Quoting Elstad/ the court said:
["]When neither the initial nor the
subsequent admission is coerced/ little
justification exists for permitting the
highly probative evidence of a voluntary
confession to be irretrievably lost to the
factfinder.
There is a vast difference between the
direct consequences flowing from coercion of
a confession by physical violence or other
deliberate means calculated to break the
suspect's will and the uncertain consequences
of disclosure of a "guilty secret" freely
given in response to an unwarned but
noncoercive question.["]
770 F.2d at 929 (emphasis in original) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad/
470 U.S. 298/ 312 (1985)).
>..-...;,,

. e court examined whether the admission of

the July 4 confession was harmless error.

After reviewing the

record, the court concluded that it was; the July 4 confession
was merely cumulative, the July 11 confession being "far more
detailed."

770 F.2d at 932.

In addition, the jury had \ he

testimony of Martin's accomplice whom Martin had told of the
murder,

Having found that the July 11 confession was properly

admitted, and that the admission of the , luiy 4 i-onfession UMS
harmless error, the court affirmed the conviction.

770 F.2d at

933.
The same analysis applies \ i \ Le present case.

While

the officers' failure to clarify defendant's equivocal reference
to the right to have an attorney present at t- ht - tonne the
i ""i"i yijr aph w.n rnimini.bt.uied may have been a technical Miranda

violation, there was no evidence of coercion or duress.
Consequently, there was no constitutional violation when
defendant was initially questioned.

Since there was no

constitutional violation, the Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine and the Bayer "cat out of the bag" rule do not
apply.

Although defendant's pre-arrest statements may have been

inadmissible due to a Miranda violation, his subsequent postarrest confession, given after proper Miranda warnings and an
unequivocal waiver of his rights, was admissible.
Furthermore, the admission of defendant's pre-arrest
statements, made after the equivocal reference to counsel, was
harmless error, at most.

The only statement made in response to

questioning by the officers was that the victim was dead.

In

light of the noninculpatory nature of that statement, the later
confession which was far more detailed, the testimony of
defendant's family members about the condition of the child, the
testimony of the medical examiner, and the testimony of
defendant's roommate about the noises in the apartment when
defendant was striking the child, the admission of the statement

The trial court did not err in finding that defendant's
statements were not coerced. Elstad teaches us that a statement
taken in violation of Miranda is not necessarily compelled or
coerced in violation of the fifth amendment. To the extent that
footnote 6 of this Court's opinion suggests that the trial court
could not have found an absence of coercion, it is inconsistent
with Elstad. Footnote 6 reads:
The court's comment on coercion represents
a bit of an overstatement in view of
Miranda's recognition that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive.
Sampson, slip op. at 5 n.6 (citation omitted).
-14-

that the child wah dead wat; harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Martin v. Wainwriqht, 770 F.2d at 932-33; State v. Hackford,
737 P.2d 200, 204-70r> (Utah 1987) (discussing and applying
federal constitutional harmless error rule), 3
POINT II
EVIDENCE ABOUT THE VICTIM'S BODY WAS PROPERLY
ADMITTED AT TRIAL.
t«... ---lough this Court concluded that defendant's prearrest statements were inadmissible because they were obtained In
violation of Miranda,

:

lalyze the question of

whether the victim's body, which was discovered as a result of
those statements and defendant's verbal and physical directions
tn Lhe officers, wda admissible physical evidence.

The Court

suggested that that evidence would not be admissible unless it
were " saved by an except I on t o t; he exc 1 us iunary rule. " Sampson/
slip op, at 21,

However, the victim's body, although discovered

as a result of the statements and acts obtained in violation of
Miranda, was ne^ ^ei: theless admissible physical evidence.

Resort

to an exception to the exclusionary rule, such -*< Lhe
"independent source doctrine" OT the ' mnvir.a

discovery rule/

see Sampson, slip op. at 21 n 1 9 , is not necessary.

"The Fifth

3
The same is true with respect to the admission of defendants
testimonial acts in leading the police to his daughter's body.
The admissibility of those testimonial acts is discussed below in
Point II.
4
Insofar as defendant's disclosure of the location of the
victim's body involved physical acts of defendant (as opposed to
statements), those acts probably would be considered testimonial
acts which, because they occurred after a Miranda violation, were
not admissible, along with defendant's pre-arrest statements.
See State v. Wethered, 110 Wash.2d 466, 755 P.2d 797, 798-800
(1988).

Amendment, of course, is not concerned with nontestimonial
evidence."

Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305. See also Schmerber v.

California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966) (defendant may be compelled
to supply blood samples).
In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974), the
United States Supreme Court "expressly left open the question of
the admissibility of physical evidence obtained as a result of an
interrogation conducted contrary to the rules set forth in
Mirandaf.1"

Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922 (1988)

(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).

By an evenly

divided vote, the Court denied certiorari in a case which would
have squarely addressed that issue.
U.S. 280 (1978).

Massachusetts v. White, 439

Subsequently, the majority of the jurisdictions

which have addressed the issue have held that a Miranda violation
does not require exclusion of the derivative evidence obtained
from the inadmissible statement.
Although Tucker specifically declined to resolve the
issue of derivative evidence, that decision is almost unanimously
read to support the concept that derivative evidence from a
statement taken in violation of Miranda is admissible.

In

Tucker, the Court determined that, although Tucker's statement
was obtained in violation of Miranda, there was no violation of
the fifth amendment.

Tucker's statement was properly excluded;

however, the testimony of a third-party witness, whose name was
discovered as a result of Tucker's statement, was admissible.
417 U.S. at 450.

In New York v, Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the
Supreme i~

t

3 issue oI the

admissibility of physical evidence which was "non-testimonial."
467 U.S. at 660 n. S . However, the Court, in holding tha t: t.hpr P
is a public safety exception to Miranda, said:
[A]bsent actual coercion by the officer there
is no constitutional imperative requiring the
exclusion of the evidence that results from
police inquiry of this kind; and we do not
believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of
Miranda require us to exclude the evidence[.]
467 U.S. at 658 n.7.

Th is language appears to support a

distinction between Miranda violations and fifth amendment
violations .

. .ation to the admission of physical evidence

seized as a result of statements by a defendant.
Some of the federal circuit courts have declined to
rule on the issue since Tucker.

See United States v. Scalf, 7 08

Ji i:40. 1545-45 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Downinq,
665 F.. :

rir. 1981).

But those courts which

have addressed the point have held that a Miranda violation does
not make the derivative evidence inadmissible

See United States

v. Patterson, 812 F.2d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 1987), cert, denied,
485 U.S. 922 (1988) (Wong Sun "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrinp not applI cab]P; physical pvidence admissible wher 1 there
is a Miranda violation but not a fifth amendment violation);
United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F. 2d 104 3 , 1 04fl (
, 'M h f" 1 r
] 9 90) (reasoning of Elstad and Tucker applies to nontestimonial
physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation);
United States ex rel Hudson v. Cannon, 5-'" 1 F ,,l< 1 H ^ 0 , H ( 14 •• H CI | ) r h
Cir. 1976) (third party testimonial fruits of a voluntary

statement are admissible, even if there has been a Miranda
violation); United States v. Barte, 868 F.2d 773, 774 (5th Cir.)/
cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 547 (1989) ("A mere violation of
Miranda's 'prophylactic' procedures does not trigger the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine.

The derivative evidence rule

operates only when an actual constitutional violation occurs, as
where a suspect confesses in response to coercion."); United
States v. Benqivenqa, 845 F.2d 593, 600-601 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 306 (1988) (nontestimonial physical evidence is
admissible even if it had been obtained in violation of Miranda);
United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987) (while statements taken in
violation of Miranda are inadmissible, defendant's consent to
search and the derivative evidence of the search are admissible
if they are not the product of an actual violation of a
constitutional right); United States v. Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 533
(5th Cir. 1989) (failure to give Miranda warnings alone will not
necessitate suppression of derivative evidence absent a
constitutional violation).
Although the Utah appellate courts have not addressed
this issue, other state courts have.

In State v. Wethered, 110

Wash.2d 466, 755 P.2d 797 (1988), the Washington Supreme Court
said:
The [United States Supreme] Court in Tucker .
. . held that the exclusion of some secondary
evidence would be warranted by a true Fifth
Amendment violation involving coercion, but
not a mere Miranda violation. Tucker, at
444-45, 94 S.Ct. at 2363-64. Although the
Court has not directly addressed the question
of admissibility of physical evidence
-18-

discovered through a confession given without
Miranda warnings, admitting such derivative
evidence appears to be the logical next step
in the Court's reasoning. . . . Dictum in
Elstad strongly suggests that a Miranda
violation without actual coercion will not
taint evidence derived from a confession, no
matter what form such evidence takes.
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308, 105 S.Ct. at 1292
("no actual infringement of the suspect's
constitutional rights, the case was not
controlled by the doctrine expressed in Wong
Sun that fruits of a constitutional violation
must be suppressed").
755 P. 2d at 801.

The Washington court held that it was "bound by

the United States Supreme Court's determination that evidence
derived from a confession made in violation of Miranda . . . need
not be suppressed under the Fifth Amendment absent actual
coercion."

755 P.2d at 802.

See also Crew v. State, 100 Nev.

38, 675 P.2d 986, 989 (1984) ("Absent a direct infringement on
fifth amendment rights, a violation of the rules of Miranda will
not support the exclusion of evidence derived from the
statement."); State v. Kutnyak, 211 Mont. 155, 685 P.2d 901, 906
(1984) (same language as Crew).
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals also explained
the admissibility of derivative evidence in In re Owen F., 70
Md.App. 678, 523 A.2d 627, cert, denied, 310 Md. 275, 528 A.2d
1286 (Md. 1987).

The Maryland court said:

Evidence derived from a confession
obtained without the benefit of a Miranda
warning is excluded, if at all, under a
relatively narrow interpretation of the
"fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine.
Under that interpretation, a failure to
provide the Miranda warning does not
necessarily preclude the introduction of
derivative evidence. Rather, that evidence
is inadmissible only if the confession from
which it was derived was coerced in violation

of defendant's right to due process. . . .
Clearly, then, obtaining a confession in
violation of the Miranda rule does not
automatically destroy the admissibility of
evidence discovered by using the unwarned
confession.
523 A.2d at 631 (footnote and citations omitted).

See also State

v. Dellorfano, 128 N.H. 562, 517 A.2d 1162, 1168 (1986) ("Only
coerced statements in violation of Miranda constitute a
contravention of constitutional rights so as to require the
suppression of the violation's derivative evidence."); Bartram v.
State, 33 Md.App. 115, 364 A.2d 1119, 1145-47 (1976) (mere
Miranda violation does not trigger the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine); State v. Doughty, 456 N.W.2d 445, 447 (Minn.App.
1990), review granted, July 31, 1990 (Tucker and Elstad
demonstrate that the Supreme Court "would not apply the
derivative evidence rule to exclude the fruits of a Miranda
violation where the statement elicited from the accused was
knowingly and voluntarily made").

But see People v. Creach, 69

Ill.App.3d 874, 387 N.E.2d 762, 776 (1979), cert, denied, 449
U.S. 1010 (1980) (pre-Elstad, and with no analysis, the court
held admission of derivative evidence was prejudicial error);
Commonwealth v. White, 371 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Mass. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 280 (1978) (pre-Elstad, and relying on the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, the court held that
derivative evidence was inadmissible); State v. Preston, 411 A. 2d
402, 408-409 (Me. 1980) (pre-Elstad, and noting that an
inevitable discovery rule had not yet been adopted by the United
States Supreme Court, the court held that derivative evidence was
inadmissible).
-20-

In the instant case, this Court has determined that
defendant's pre-arrest statements were inadmissible due to a
Miranda violation.

Any non-verbal acts by defendant in taking

the police officers to the body were probably testimonial in
nature and therefore also inadmissible after the alleged Miranda
violation.

See State v. Wethered, 755 P.2d at 798-800.

However,

the physical evidence, the body itself, was admissible under the
extensions of Tucker and Elstad which have been expounded by the
cases set out above.

Evidence derived from a statement or

confession obtained in violation of Miranda is excludable, if at
all, under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.

Under

Elstad, that doctrine is inapplicable to a Miranda violation
which is not a fifth amendment violation.
Since the trial court specifically found that
defendant's pre-arrest statements and testimonial acts were not
compelled in violation of the fifth amendment, the physical
evidence derived from those statements and acts—i.e., the
victim's body—was admissible.

So also was the evidence of the

medical examination of the victim which helped to establish the
element of depraved indifference for second degree murder.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1)(c) (1990).
This Court need not remand this matter.

From the

record, this Court can determine that defendant's confession,
taken after his arrest and the second set of Miranda warnings,
was admissible and that the admission of the pre-arrest
statements and acts was harmless error.

This Court can also

determine that the victim's body, and the attendant medical
testimony, were properly admitted.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing discussion, it appears that the
Court in State v. Sampson either overlooked or misapprehended
significant case law in determining that both defendant's prearrest statements and confession should have been suppressed.
This Court also failed to address the admissibility of the
physical evidence which was properly admitted by the trial court.
Therefore, the State's petition for rehearing should be granted
and defendant's homicide conviction and sentence affirmed.
Counsel for the State hereby certifies that this petition is
presented in good faith and not for purposes of delay.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

1—

day of October, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CHARLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage
prepaid, to Andrew Valdez, Elizabeth A. Bowman, and Richard G.
Uday, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, Attorneys for defendant,
424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this
c? —

day of October, 1990.
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ADDENDUM

IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS
OOOoo
State of Utah,

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 890327-CA

Carlos R. Sampson,
Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:
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Own &*>.n m Acpedts

Andrew A. Valdez, Elizabeth A. Bowman, and Richard
G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Defendant appeals his conviction for criminal homicide,
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990). We reverse and remand for
a new trial.
On November 24, 1986, at approximately 10:30 p.m.,
defendant entered a 7-Eleven store in Salt Lake County and told
the clerks that his daughter had been kidnapped. He asked them
to call the police, which they did.
Deputies from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office
responded. Defendant informed them that his daughter had been
abducted from his truck. He gave them a description of his
daughter and a photograph. The officers investigated the
alleged kidnapping until 4:00 a.m. At some point during the
evening, defendant was informed the police did not believe his
story. The officers asked defendant to come to headquarters
the following morning for a polygraph examination. He agreed.

At approximately 10:30 a.m. on November 25, defendant
arrived at police headquarters. He was met by the polygraph
examiner, Sergeant Elliot, who had been briefed about the
events which occurred on the prior evening. Defendant was
escorted to a small interrogation room, hooked up to a
polygraph machine, and instructed about how polygraph machines
worked. Sgt. Elliot then explained the purpose for giving
defendant the test. He said:
When we walk out of here we ought to be
able to tell the detectives Carlos is
truthful when he says the child was taken
out of the truck, he had not prearranged
with anyone to take the child. Uh, also,
Carlos is not involved in the death of the
child if the child is, in fact, dead.
And, uh, those are the two things that we
will accomplish today.1
After explaining to defendant the purpose of the test,
Sgt. Elliot gave defendant the Miranda warnings. He began by
stating: "Because you are in the cop shop there is no doubt in
your mind that this is the police station and, uh, because you
are in taking a polygraph from a law enforcement agency I must
advise you of your rights again."2 After reading defendant
each of his rights, the following exchange ensued:
1. These purposes were again repeated during the exam, with
even more specificity. Later in the exam, Sgt. Elliot stated:
Okay, good, okay, uh, at the beginning of
the test I told you what the things were
that we needed to show. Number one is
that you did not arrange with anyone to
take the child but that you haven't got
someone taking care of her, she is not
hidden out and you are not doing this to
deprive Antoinette visitation of the
child. And, uh, secondly, you did nothing
to injure the child and you, and if she in
fact is not alive, did not cause her
death, right?
2. It is not clear from the record why Sgt. Elliot stated that
he had to advise defendant of his rights "again." It is clear,
however, that the first and only Miranda warnings defendant
received prior to his formal arrest were given by Sgt. Elliot
at the outset of the polygraph examination.

Elliot: Okay, having these rights in mind
do you wish to talk to me now.
Sampson: Well, uh, should I have a
lawyer, I mean, well, I'm really not
worried about anything, it is just
that . . . .
Elliot: Okay, if you are not worried
about anything I would say that is fine,
let's go ahead and proceed. Let's get
this thing done and get it over with and
see what we can do.
Sampson:

I'm willing to get it over with.

Defendant then read and signed a form listing his Miranda
rights and indicating his willingness to take the polygraph
test.
During the polygraph examination, Sgt. Elliot asked
defendant whether he arranged the disappearance or caused the
death of his child and whether he knew where she was
hidden.3 He asked defendant this series of questions four
times. To the question concerning where his daughter was
hidden, defendant responded in the negative each time and each
time the polygraph suggested a deceitful response. After the
last set of questions, Sgt. Elliot informed defendant about the
test results. He asked defendant why his response to the
question concerning whether he knew where his daughter was
hidden appeared to be false. Defendant said he thought maybe
the child's mother had done something with her.
After concluding the examination, Sgt. Elliot and
defendant went to find Salt Lake County Sheriff Pete Hayward.
Sgt. Elliot told Sheriff Hayward about the test results. He
told him that he believed defendant had been untruthful and
informed him that defendant had been "Mirandized," but

3. The specific inculpatory questions asked during the
examination were:
1) Have you caused the death of Miyako?
2) Do you know where Miyako is hidden now?
3) Have you arranged the disappearance of
Miyako?

apparently did not acquaint the sheriff with the particulars of
defendant's responses after his rights had been read to him.
Sheriff Hayward then returned with defendant to the
polygraph room for further questioning. He did not give
defendant the Miranda warnings.4 He informed defendant that
there were inconsistencies in his story and that he did not
believe defendant was telling the truth. He then asked
defendant whether he had injured his daughter. Ultimately,
defendant stated his daughter was dead and that he could show
the police where she was located.
Defendant accompanied Sheriff Hayward and another deputy
to a dumpster in American Fork where his daughter's body was
located. After retrieving the body, the officers placed
defendant under arrest and returned him to Salt Lake City.
When the officers again met with defendant, defendant was read
his Miranda rights. He agreed to talk with the investigating
officer, who thereafter questioned him concerning the
circumstances surrounding his daughter's death.
Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress
all statements made by defendant during and after the polygraph
examination on November 25, 1986, and all evidence derived as a
result of those statements. Counsel argued that the police
officers had violated defendant's Miranda rights by continuing
to question him after he made an equivocal request for
counsel. The trial court denied the motion.
In support of its decision to deny defendant's motion to
suppress, the court stated in pertinent part:
The court finds, first, that as you
have agreed, the standard of evidence must
be a preponderance of the evidence5 to
4. It is not entirely clear why the sheriff did not give
defendant his Miranda warnings. Apparently, however, he relied
upon Sgt. Elliot's explanation that defendant had been
"Mirandized.H
5. At least one Utah case has recognized Hpreponderance of the
evidence" as the appropriate standard for determining the
voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights. See State v.
Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). The preponderance
standard is difficult to square with Miranda's holding that the
state bears a heavy burden, if counsel was not present, to show
a knowing and intelligent waiver of the defendant's Miranda

establish the voluntariness of the
interrogation and waiver.
Court finds that the defendant
clearly understood what his rights were
and what he was waiving, that there is
nothing in the record to show that the
police did anything or acted in any way
improperly so as to constitute any kind of
coercion6 in this matter so as to cause
the defendant not to fully understand his
rights and to leave him in a position
where he was acting in a coerced sort of
way. • . .
I believe he had an unfettered right
of choice, that he did not request an
attorney, that the language -Well, ah,
should I have a lawyer, I mean, well, I'm
really not worried about anything, it is
just that . . ."is not sufficient to
cause the police to be concerned as to the
claim or any suggestion that the defendant
wished to claim a right to counsel.
I also find that there was no need to
give continuous advice as to subsequent
requests for the selection of counsel7
or the waiver of the same.
I also find further that the forum
was adequate, the [rights] were clearly
(Footnote 5 continued)
rights. See Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has adopted the
"preponderance of the evidence" test in evaluating Miranda
waiver questions. Colorado v. Connelly. 479 U.S. 157, 107
S.Ct. 515, 523 (1986K
6. The court's comment on coercion represents a bit of an
overstatement in view of Miranda's recognition that custodial
interrogation is inherently coercive. See 384 U.S. at 467.
7. Despite the court's phraseology in its remarks from the
bench, it is apparent from the record that defendant never made
any "subsequent requests" for counsel after his statement to
Sgt. Elliot.

explained to the defendant. He
voluntarily and knowingly waived his right
to counsel and I cannot find that the
motion to suppress should be granted and,
therefore, it is denied.
A five-day jury trial was held in September 1987. Having
lost his motion to suppress, defendant sought and obtained a
continuing objection to the admission of evidence resulting
from the police interrogation. At the conclusion of the trial,
the jury found defendant guilty of second degree homicide. He
was sentenced to a term of five years to life at the Utah State
Prison.
Defendant has raised numerous issues on appeal, but his
primary contention is that the court committed prejudicial
error when it denied his motion to suppress. Because we must
reverse and remand on this issue, we need not address the other
issues raised by defendant.
Neither party has identified the standard of review for
this appeal. However, both parties apparently concede that the
trial court's ultimate conclusions concerning the waiver of
defendant's Miranda rights, which conclusions were based upon
essentially undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of
Sgt. Elliot's colloquy with defendant, present questions of law
reviewable under a correction-of-error standard. Such a
conclusion is consistent with the general notion that a trial
court's "findings" based upon undisputed facts present
questions of law on appeal. Diversified Equities, Inc. v.
American Sav. & Loan Assoc, 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (quoting City of Spencer v. Hawkey Sec. Ins. Co., 216
N.W.2d 406, 408 (Iowa 1974)). ££. Transamerica Cash Reserve,
Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990)
(same standard for review of summary judgment, which
necessarily involves undisputed facts). See also People v.
Russo, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1172, 196 Cal. Rptr. 466, 468 (1983)
(where Miranda warnings and ensuing discussion were recorded,
facts deemed undisputed and appellate court required to
"independently assess whether [defendant] knowingly and
intelligently waived his rights"). Thus, we do not accord any
particular deference to the trial court's conclusions, although
couched as findings, but, rather, review them for correctness.
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United
States Supreme Court stated that ••the prosecution may not use
statements . . . stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural

safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination.- I£. at 444. One of those procedural
safeguards is a warning that the defendant has the right to an
attorney during custodial interrogation. XJJ. Moreover, the
Court noted that if defendant -indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.- I&. at
444-45. Finally, when custodial interrogation continues
without the presence of a defense attorney and damaging
evidence results from the interrogation, the state has a heavy
burden to show that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his Miranda rights. i£. at 475.
We must address two questions in this appeal. First, we
must determine whether defendant was subject to "custodial
interrogation" at the time he made his incriminating
statements. Second, assuming custodial interrogation, we must
determine whether defendant requested, or knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to, counsel.
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Initially, defendant claims the state failed to raise
below the issue of whether there actually was a "custodial
interrogation" and thus should be precluded from arguing on
appeal that there was not. See generally State v. Marshall,
791 P.2d 880, 885-87 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Though we agree the
state did not dwell on the issue, it was sufficiently raised at
the suppression hearing to be preserved for this appeal. We
note, however, that the trial court did not base its denial of
the motion to suppress upon the lack of custody nor intimate
any doubt that the colloquy between Sgt. Elliot and defendant
occurred in conjunction with a custodial interrogation.
Instead, it concluded that defendant was informed of his
rights, understood his rights, and voluntarily waived
them—conclusions which would be irrelevant if the court
thought there had been no custodial interrogation.
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court defined
-custodial interrogation" as -questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966). The Court expanded on this definition in Oregon v.
Mathiason, 425 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam). "Miranda warnings
are required only where there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.1" I£. at 495.
Later, in California v. Beheler. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) (per

curiam), the Court stated that "the ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement* of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Id.
at 1125.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has indicated
that the test is an objective one, i.e., that "the only
relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's
position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v.
McCartv, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). See, e.g., Hunter v. State,
590 P.2d 888, 895 (Alaska 1979) (The question is not whether
the particular defendant considered himself in custody, but
whether a "reasonable person [under the same circumstances]
would feel he was not free to leave and break off police
questioning."); People v. Algien, 180 Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468,
471 (1972) (en banc).
The Utah Supreme Court has identified several key factors
to consider in order to determine when a defendant
who has not been formally arrested is in
custody. They are: (1) the site of
interrogation; (2) whether the
investigation focused on the accused; (3)
whether the objective indicia of arrest
were present; and (4) the length and form
of interrogation.
Salt Lake Citv v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983).
Another factor which we find pertinent to our analysis was
recognized by our Oregon counterpart in State v. Herrera, 49
Or. App. 1075, 621 P.2d 1209 (1980). That factor is (5) whether
the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and
willingly. Id. at 1212. We now apply these five factors,
along with the objective standard adopted in Berkemer, to the
undisputed facts in this case.
A brief mention of factors (1), (3) and (5) is sufficient
because we find them relatively "neutral." Concerning factor
(1), the site of interrogation was the police station.
Station-house questioning lends itself to a finding of custody,
a concept which Sgt. Elliot recognized in his "cop shop"
introductory remark, although that fact alone is not
conclusive. See, e.g., Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495.
Considering factor (3), defendant was apparently not securely
restrained or told that he was under arrest until after his
daughter's body was discovered. However, it is pertinent to
note that he was not specifically informed of his freedom to

leave8 and that once the polygraph examination started, he
was restrained in the limited sense that he was hooked to the
polygraph machine.9 Turning to factor (5), the defendant
went voluntarily to the police station after receiving an
invitation to do so. The fact that he went voluntarily,
however, does not mean he was free to leave during the entire
remainder of the interrogation.
The two factors which conclusively tip the scale and
persuade us that defendant was in custody are factors (2), the
focus of the investigation, and (4), the form of the
interrogation. The interplay of these two factors at the time
defendant made incriminating statements would lead a reasonable
person to believe that he was not free to leave.
Concerning factor (2), the state essentially concedes that
the investigation in this case had focused exclusively on
defendant. Before the conclusion of the evening when defendant
reported the fictitious kidnapping, officers had informed
defendant that they did not believe his story. As a result of
their disbelief, they requested defendant to return the
following morning for a polygraph test. Nothing in the record
suggests other suspects were sought or questioned, or other
leads pursued, in the meanwhile. The questions asked during
the polygraph examination clearly indicate a strong suspicion
that defendant had kidnapped or killed his own daughter. It is
obvious from these facts that defendant was the prime, if not
exclusive, suspect of the police investigation. A reasonable
person under the circumstances would surely so have concluded,
especially given the expressed disbelief at his story.
Finally, factor (4) weighs heavily in favor of a
determination of custody. Utah courts have placed a great deal
of emphasis on the form of the questioning in these types of
cases. As long as questioning remains merely investigatory,
courts have not found custody. See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 718
P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986). However, when investigatory
questioning shifts to accusatory questioning, custody is likely
8. Under certain circumstances, even defendants who are told
they are free to leave will nonetheless be held to have been
subjected to custodial interrogation. See, e.g., United States
v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
9. According to the transcript of the polygraph examination,
the polygraph machine was attached to defendant by two tubes
encircling his trunk, finger plates on his ring and index
fingers, and a blood pressure cuff on his right arm.

and Miranda warnings become necessary, earner, 664 P.2d at
1170. £££ also Kellv, 718 P.2d at 391. The change from
investigatory to accusatory questioning occurs when the "police
have reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed and also reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant committed it." Carner, 664 P.2d at 1171. See also
Kellv, 718 P.2d at 391.
Assuming, without deciding, that the polygraph examination
itself was merely investigatory,10 we find that the
questioning became accusatory when Sgt. Elliot and Sheriff
Hayward determined that defendant had lied on the exam. The
officers knew prior to the polygraph exam that a crime had been
committed. They suspected kidnapping and possibly even
murder. Moreover, they clearly suspected defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime. The polygraph exam results merely
confirmed their suspicions. Knowing the suspicions of the
police and then being confronted with the polygraph exam
results, a reasonable person in defendant's position would not
10. In view of the result we reach, we need not decide in this
case whether the polygraph examination as such was accusatory
interrogation and whether defendant was in custody from the
inception of the exam. We note, however, that numerous courts
have leaned toward finding such examinations to be custodial, a
view which seems to command majority support and to be
well-reasoned. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97 N.J. 113, 477
A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) (noting that strict Miranda-type
analysis is typically applied to polygraph confessions);
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 439 Penn. 34, 264 A.2d 706, 707 (1970)

(state's suggestion that defendant was not in custody for
polygraph was "attempt to have [court] submerge [its]
intelligence"); State v. Faller, 277 N.W.2d 433, 435 (S.D.
1975) ("situation a lie detector test presents can best be
described as a psychological rubber hose"); Creeks v. State,
542 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. 1976) (where investigation has
focused on defendant, Miranda warnings required before
polygraph); People v. Carter, 7 Cal. App. 3d 332, 88 Cal. Rptr.
546, 549 (1970) ("Questioning during the course of a lie
detector test certainly qualifies as a form of custodial
interrogation."), overruled on other grounds, 6 Cal. 3d 441,
492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972). But see, e.g., Whalen v.
State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1352 (Del. 1980)("appearance at the
police station for the polygraph test demonstrates a waiver of
his Miranda rights"), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982); People
v. Bailey, 140 A.D.2d 356, 527 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847-48 (1988)
(willingness to aid in investigation demonstrated that
polygraph not custodial).

have considered himself free to leave at that time. 11 Thus,
we hold that, at least as of the time of Sheriff Hayward's
questioning of defendant, defendant was subject to custodial
interrogation and entitled to proper Miranda warnings.
This case is similar to, and the result we reach
consistent with, the Colorado case of People v. Alaien, 180
Colo. 1, 501 P.2d 468 (1972) (en banc). In Alaien. the
defendant, along with other individuals, was suspected of
arson. 501 P.2d at 469. He voluntarily submitted to a
polygraph examination. Iji. At no time was he advised of his
Miranda rights. I£. at 470. Prior to the examination he was
informed that the purpose of the test was to determine his
involvement in the fire. I£. at 469-70. He was then asked
questions concerning his guilt. !£. The exam was given three
times and each time the test indicated his negative responses
were not truthful. Id. at 470. At the conclusion of the test,
he was confronted with the opinion that he was lying and, after
discussing the matter, defendant confessed. Id.
The trial court in Alaien found that once the officers
concluded defendant was lying during the exam, the suspicion of
guilt focused on him and the officers should have read him his
Miranda rights. L£. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with
the trial court and held that Ma reasonable person would with
logic conclude that he could not leave the premises of his own
free will but would be detained for formal arrest.- I&. at
471. Consequently, it affirmed the decision of the trial court
to suppress defendant's confession.
Other courts have applied an Alaien-type analysis to
post-polygraph confessions. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 97
N.J. 113, 477 A.2d 1265, 1269 (1984) ("When defendants are not
advised of their Miranda rights, or do not properly waive them,
confessions elicited after a polygraph test are typically
suppressed.-); People v. Harris, 128 A.D.2d 891, 513 N.Y.S.2d
817, 818 (1987) (mem.) (confession admissible because defendant
appeared voluntarily for polygraph test and fully advised of
rights before post-polygraph confession). The rationale of
11. The state cites testimony to the effect that defendant did
not consider himself under arrest even after he was formally
arrested, suggesting this demonstrates that defendant could not
have believed he was in custody when he first confessed. This
evidence is at most a commentary on defendant's acumen. Under
the objective "reasonable person- test, defendant's subjective
belief about custody is not relevant. Berkemer v. McCartv. 468
U.S. 420, 442 (1984).

these polygraph cases comports with our view of custodial
interrogation and thus we adopt their reasoning in this case.
We need not decide whether defendant was in custody from
the inception of the polygraph examination*2 because no
confession was elicited until after the exam was completed and
the sheriff summoned. It is sufficient to conclude that, Sgt.
Elliot having determined defendant was lying in the exam,
Miranda warnings were necessary before further questioning
could properly proceed.
It is clear from the record that defendant was not given
Miranda warnings between the conclusion of the polygraph exam
and the time he was formally arrested.13 Thus, unless we
12. But see note 10, supra. It is interesting to note that
the polygraph examiner considered Miranda warnings at the
outset of the polygraph examination to be a necessity. He
stated: "Because you are in the cop shop there is no doubt in
your mind that this is the police station and/ uh, because you
are in taking a polygraph from a law enforcement agency I must
advise you of your rights . . . . H But see People v. Sohn, 148
A.D.2d 553/ 539 N.Y.S.2d 29/ 31 (1989) (mem.) (giving of
Miranda warnings was -apparently out of an 'excess of caution*
[and did] not preclude a finding that [defendant] was not in
custody").
Sergeant Elliot's approach/ whether or not legally
required, surely seems prudent/ if for no other reason than
that it forecloses the possibility a suspect will blurt out a
confession after his deception has been ascertained but before
Miranda warnings can be issued. Moreover/ as an arm of the
state, the police have a responsibility to protect the
constitutional rights of the citizenry, and erring on the side
of giving the Miranda warnings before they are strictly
required advances that function, as well as minimizes the risk
that important evidence will be excluded because the warnings
were not given early enough in the process.
13. As indicated previously. Sheriff Hayward apparently relied
upon Sgt. Elliot's claim that defendant had been properly
"Mirandized" at the commencement of the polygraph exam.
Although Sheriff Hayward, out of the same abundance of caution
that may have motivated Sgt. Elliot, should ideally have given
new Miranda warnings to defendant prior to interrogating him,
the earlier warnings would have sufficed had Sgt. Elliot
elicited a clear waiver of those rights from defendant at that
time. £g£ State v. Martinez, 595 P.2d 897, 899-900 (Utah 1979)

find that defendant's Miranda rights were adequately protected
(Footnote 13 continued)
(the law does not require repetition of Miranda rights within a
short period of time and a continuous sequence of events even
though defendant's status may actually change in the interim).
The state did not argue that Sheriff Hayward's -good
faith- reliance upon Sgt. Elliot's claim he previously issued
Miranda warnings warranted an exception to the exclusionary
rule. However, we note that, contrary to the trend in the
Fourth Amendment area, courts have declined to create a -good
faith- exception in the context of the Fifth Amendment. United
States v. Scalf, 708 F.2d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) ("once a suspect has invoked the right to counsel,
knowledge of that request is imputed to all law enforcement
officers who subsequently deal with the suspect-). See also
Arizona v. Roberson, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2101 (1988) (implicitly
rejecting "good faith" argument); White v. Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d
885, 887 n.9 (7th Cir. 1982) (declining to create exception
absent clear indication from United States Supreme Court),
vacated on other grounds, 465 U.S. 1075 (1984).
An excellent treatment of a possible -good faithexception to the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule is found in
M. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda
Rule—A Critigue, 35 Hastings L.J. 429 (1984). Professor
Gardner concludes:
While there may be reason to doubt the
constitutional necessity of the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule, the fifth
amendment privilege is. itself a
constitutionally required exclusionary
rule. Whereas a fourth amendment
violation occurs at the moment of the
unlawful privacy violation, violations of
the privilege against self-incrimination
do not occur unless and until the
government uses the tainted evidence
against the defendant in a criminal
proceeding. Although alternatives to the
exclusionary rule might conceivably be
developed to protect fourth amendment
privacy interests, no alternative could
possibly protect the fifth amendment
values of maintaining an accusatorial
system and respecting the dignity of

by reason of the exchange
examination undertaken by
adequate "Mirandizing" of
custodial confession. We
waived his Miranda rights

at the outset of the polygraph
Sgt. Elliot,14 there was no
defendant before he gave his
now examine whether defendant validly
at that time.
WAIVER

On appeal, defendant does not argue that the state failed
to adequately inform him of his Miranda rights. Prior to the
polygraph examination, Sgt. Elliot carefully informed defendant
of each of his rights. Instead, defendant argues that he made
an Hequivocal request- for counsel which the state failed to
(Footnote 13 continued)
criminal defendants. If use of compelled
self-incriminating evidence is permitted,
the fifth amendment's protection is
destroyed.
Id. at 462-63.
14. We note that defendant was given a second set of Miranda
warnings after he had informed Sheriff Hayward that his
daughter was dead, gone with the police to American Fork to
retrieve the body, been arrested, and been returned to Salt
Lake City. Apparently recognizing that by that time all the
damage had been done, the state does not argue the second set
of Miranda warnings are of any consequence to our analysis.
Defendant, on the other hand, argues that because he had
previously invoked his right to counsel, albeit equivocally;
had not been provided an attorney; and had not initiated any
subsequent interrogation with the police, the fruits of the
post-arrest interrogations must also be suppressed. We agree.
In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), the United States
Supreme Court held that once a defendant has invoked his right
to counsel, statements made without counsel in subsequent
interrogations initiated by the police, even when pursuant to
renewed Miranda warnings, must be suppressed. Id. at 484-87.
See also State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah 1985) (accused
must initiate conversation). The rule in Edwards applies even
more forcefully in a case such as this where the subsequent
interrogation is prompted by, and designed to explain,
information which has come to the police as a direct result of
an earlier Miranda violation.

clarify and, if appropriate, to honor. It is telling that the
state does not address this issue on appeal, but instead puts
all its eggs in the Nno custodial interrogation- basket.
Nonetheless, because the state stops short of conceding the
point and in view of its importance, we will address the issue
in some detail.
Initially we note that, though a defendant may waive his
rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during
custodial interrogation, "these waivers must be both
intentional and made with full knowledge of the consequences,
and the defendant is given the benefit of every reasonable
presumption against such a waiver." State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d
1208, 1211 (Utah 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988).
See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
Consequently, the state has a heavy burden to establish both
that a defendant understood his Miranda rights and that he
voluntarily waived them. State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 443
(Utah 1986).
The state argued below, and the trial court found, that
defendant's statement -Well, ah, should I have a lawyer, I
mean, well, I'm really not worried about anything, it is just
that . . .- did not qualify as even an equivocal request for
counsel which the police had to be concerned about. We
disagree.
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court stated: "If
[defendant] indicates in any manner and at any stage of the
process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking there can be no questioning." 384 U.S. at 444-45
(emphasis added). Thus, a defendant's "request for counsel may
be ambiguous or equivocal,- Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95
(1984) (per curiam), and still qualify as an invocation of
Mjranfla rights.
This court dealt with an equivocal request for counsel in
State v. Griffin. 754 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In
Griffin, the defendant stated during interrogation, "This is a
lie. I'm calling an attorney." I£. at 966. We held that this
statement "was arguably equivocal." Ifl. at 969. Defendant's
statement in this case was less forceful than that in Griffin.
However, other jurisdictions have found statements very similar
to the one in this case to have constituted equivocal requests
for counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d
1124, 1127 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Maybe I should talk to an attorney
before I make a further statement.-), cert, denied, 479 U.S.
1056 (1987); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th
Cir. 1985) (-might want to talk to a lawyer-), cert, denied.

486 U.S. 1017 (1988); United States v. Prestiqiacomo, 504 F.
Supp. 681, 683 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mem.) (-maybe it would be good
to have a lawyer-); Cheatham v. State, 719 P.2d 612, 618 (Wyo.
1986) (after being asked if he wanted to talk, defendant
responded -Well I don't care, I'd like to see a lawyer, too you
know"); Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska Ct. App.
1985) (-I've got one question . . . [and the question is
concerning a lawyer] . . . how would I be able to get one, a
lawyer?-); People v. Russo, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1172, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 466, 468 (1983) (WI don't know if I should have a lawyer
here or what.-); State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074,
1083 (Ct. App. 1983) ("Maybe I need an attorney"); State v.
Smith, 34 Wash. App. 405, 661 P.2d 1001, 1003 (1983) (MDo you
think I need an attorney?-). See also United States v. Porter,
764 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1985) (unsuccessful call to attorney's
office in presence of officer treated as equivocal request for
counsel), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987); People v. Quirk,
129 Cal. App. 3d 618, 181 Cal. Rptr. 301, 308 (1982) (inquiry
by defendant as to whether wife had hired an attorney treated
as equivocal request for counsel). We hold that defendant's
statement in this case was of a caliber similar to those just
quoted, and like them, constituted an equivocal request for
counsel.15 See also Comment, Equivocal Requests for
Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy Considerations, 55
Cine. L. Rev. 767, 770-71 (1987) [hereinafter -The Cincinnati
Comment-] (categorizing recurring types of equivocal requests
for counsel, including as one category -[i]ndecisive statements
that indicate uncertainty in the suspect's mind about the need
or advisability of obtaining legal representation-).
Courts have developed different standards to handle
equivocal requests for counsel. The United States Supreme
Court identified three methods for handling equivocal requests
in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95-96 & n.3 (1984), but
declined to identify any of them as the constitutionally
correct one.
Some courts have held that all
questioning must cease upon any request
15. -Equivocal request- appears to be an imprecise term in
this context. Many of the references to attorneys which are
held to be equivocal requests for counsel are not requests at
all. It may be preferable to refer to such statements as
-equivocal references to an attorney." See, e.g., Note, The
Right to Counsel Purina Custodial Interrogation: Equivocal
References to an Attorney, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1159 (1986)
[hereinafter -The Vanderbilt Note-].

for or reference to counsel, however
equivocal or ambiguous. . . . Others have
attempted to define a threshold standard
of clarity for such requests, and have
held that requests falling below this
threshold do not trigger the right to
counsel. . . . Still others have adopted
a third approach, holding that when an
accused makes an equivocal statement that
-arguably- can be construed as a request
for counsel, all interrogation must
immediately cease except for narrow
questions designed to -clarify" the
earlier statement and the accused's
desires respecting counsel.
Id. at 96 n.3 (emphasis added). In Griffin, this court adopted
the third approach, holding -that when an accused makes an
arguably equivocal request for counsel during custodial
interrogation, further questioning must be limited to
clarifying the request.- 754 P.2d at 969. We remain convinced
that this middle approach16 is preferable to either of the
two more extreme positions and note that it is regarded as the
majority view. Note, Judicial Approaches to the Ambiguous
Reguest for Counsel, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 460, 472 (1987)
[hereinafter -The Notre Dame Note"]. It is also favored by
commentators as the approach which best balances the interests
of law enforcement and the rights of the accused. See, e.g.,
Note, The Right to Counsel During Custodial Interrogation:
Equivocal References to an Attorney, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1159,
1187-94 (1986); The Notre Dame Note at 472-73; The Cincinnati
Comment at 783.
Unfortunately, neither Sgt. Elliot nor Sheriff Hayward
attempted to clarify defendant's equivocal reference to an
attorney. The transcript of the polygraph examination—and the
actual tape is not part of our record—indicates a pause
following defendant's equivocal statements about counsel after
which Sgt. Elliot stated "Okay, if you are not worried about
anything I would say that is fine, let's go ahead and
proceed.- Nothing in this statement by Sgt. Elliot nor any
subsequent statement amounts to an effort to clarify
defendant's request. Although, as indicated previously, the
state did not see fit to brief the -equivocal request for
counsel- issues on appeal, it argued below that defendant's
16. See The Vanderbilt Note at 1187 (clarification approach
represents Ha middle position").

subsequent statement that he was -willing to get it over with"
was sufficient to clarify his position and to demonstrate a
waiver of his right to counsel.17 We disagree.

17. The state also argued below that defendant's signing the
written waiver form, on the heels of his "willing to get it
over with" comment, clarified that his position was to waive
his right to counsel. At least one court has accepted this
argument. See State v. Smith, 34 Wash. App. 405, 661 P.2d
1001, 1003 (1983). In Smith, the defendant signed a waiver
form subsequent to his equivocal reference to counsel and then
proceeded to speak with the officers. Our Washington
counterpart found those facts sufficient to demonstrate a
waiver on the part of the defendant.
We decline to adopt the Washington position for three
reasons. First, we find the position inconsistent with the
presumption against waiver. See State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d
1208, 1211 (Utah 1987). Second, we have already noted that
once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, statements made
in subsequent interrogations, without counsel present and even
if pursuant to renewed warnings, must also be suppressed unless
defendant initiates the contact. See note 14, supra. If
police cannot circumvent the rule through renewed Miranda
warnings days after a request for counsel, we see no reason to
allow them to do so through a simple waiver form given on the
heels of the equivocal reference without any clarification.
Finally, other courts have not found a waiver where the
defendant has signed a waiver form immediately after an
unclarified, equivocal reference to counsel. See, e.g., United
States v. Prestiaiacomo. 504 F. Supp. 681, 682-84 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) (mem.). ££. United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405
(9th Cir. 1985) (M[T]he police may not use a statement a
suspect makes after an equivocal request for counsel, but
before the request is clarified, as an effective waiver of the
right to counsel.-). Especially in this case, that approach
makes sense. Once defendant made an equivocal reference to
counsel, as explained in the text Sgt. Elliot could properly do
only one thing—seek clarification. Instead, he concluded that
defendant was -not worried," that they should -proceed . . .
and get it over with . . . .,- and he submitted the written
form to defendant for signature. In effect, submission of the
written form to defendant was an integral part of Sgt. Elliot's
conduct which was at odds with his duty to clarify and as such,
the written form cannot be taken as clarifying defendant's
equivocal request.

This case is similar to United States v. Prestiqiacomo,
504 F. Supp. 681 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mem.), and State v. Moulds,
105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074 (Ct. App. 1983), which were
favorably cited by this court in Griffin. In Prestiqiacomo.
the interrogator did not clarify the defendant's equivocal
request for counsel. 504 F. Supp. at 682. Instead, he asked
defendant whether he would continue to answer questions. L£.
After receiving an affirmative response, he proceeded to
interrogate him. III. The court in that case found the
interrogator had given Hthe impression that what defendant said
would not be treated as a sign, albeit an equivocal one, that
he wished a lawyer.- IdL at 684. That tactic was improper
and, consequently, the court suppressed the statements which
resulted from further interrogation. I£.
In Moulds, the defendant made an equivocal request for
counsel. 673 P.2d at 1083. Instead of clarifying the request,
the interrogator recognized defendant's right, informed
defendant that the decision was his to make, and then proceeded
to discuss the case with defendant. Icl. Thereafter, the
defendant made incriminating remarks. !£. The Idaho court
found that defendant's "statements were the products of
interrogation continued at the instance of the police after the
right to counsel had been invoked.- Ifl. at 1085.
Consequently, the court affirmed the suppression of the
statements. i£.
The fatal flaw in both Prestiqiacomo and Moulds was the
failure to cease interrogation except for the very limited
purpose of clarifying whether defendant wished to assert his
right to counsel. The fact that defendant continued to answer
questions was not a sufficient indication that he was
abandoning his right to counsel. In contrast, Griffin serves
as an example of a valid waiver of Miranda rights following
clarification of an ambiguous reference to counsel. In
Griffin, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, which he
waived. 754 P.2d at 966. However, during the ensuing
interview there came a time when he said, -I'm calling an
attorney." Id. The interrogating officer immediately asked,
"OK, are you saying you don't want to talk anymore?M1° Id.
18. The main problem inherent in the clarification approach is
-the additional opportunity given to law enforcement officials
to . . . [use] clarifying questions to dissuade- suspects from
asserting their right to counsel. The Notre Dame Note at 472.
See Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 104 n.9 (2nd Cir. 1984);
Daniel v. State. 644 P.2d 172, 177 (Wyo. 1982) (permissible for
officer to -seek clarification of the suspect's desires, as

at 966-67. Defendant's response indicated he would continue to
talk to the detective at that time, but planned to talk to an
attorney later. I&. at 967. Thus, although the conviction in
Griffin was reversed on other grounds, further interrogation
following the clarifying exchange just described was held not
violative of defendant's Miranda rights.
Defendant's statement in this case included a reference to
an attorney which is properly classed as an equivocal request
for counsel. Because Sgt. Elliot's warnings were the only
Miranda warnings which defendant received before undergoing
custodial interrogation, it was necessary that someone clarify
that equivocal request before defendant could be subjected to
custodial interrogation. Defendant's request was never
clarified and, consequently, the state failed to demonstrate a
valid waiver of defendant's right to counsel. The trial court
erred in holding to the contrary. We accordingly reverse and
remand for a new trial.
Because the trial court concluded that defendant's Miranda
rights had not been violated, the parties did not have occasion
to argue which evidence had to be excluded and whether any

(Footnote 18 continued)
long as he does not disguise the clarification as a subterfuge
for coercion or intimidation").
See also Thompson v.
WainwriQht, 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1979) (during
purported effort to clarify, officer asserted that obtaining
counsel may not be in defendant's best interest); Hampel v.
State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1182 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (during
purported effort to clarify, officer emphasized delay and
complexity of obtaining an attorney).
One commentator has suggested that only one question
should be permitted to seek clarification. With our
embellishment in the form of an introductory statement, that
question is as follows: You have been advised of your rights,
including the right to have an attorney with you during this
interview even if you cannot afford to hire one. What you just
said leads me to wonder whether or not you wish to avail
yourself of that right. "Do you want the assistance of [an
attorney] at this time or do you agree to answer questions
without the presence of [an attorney]?" Comment, Equivocal
Requests for Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy
Considerations, 55 Cine. L. Rev. 767, 782 (1987).

exceptions to the exclusionary rule might apply.19 On
remand, the parties must of course be allowed to argue these
various points. After entertaining these arguments, the trial
court must exclude all primary evidence elicited during the
custodial interrogation and all incriminating evidence derived
therefrom which is not saved by an exception to the
exclusionary rule. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479
(1966); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 441 (1984).
Our decision is a difficult one and will be a source of
consternation to many, who will question why the state should
be put to the cost and burden of having to retry someone who
clearly is guilty. But while the results in particular cases
19. The "independent source doctrine" and -inevitable
discovery ruleH are among the exceptions to the exclusionary
rule. Sg£ State v. Northrup. 756 P.2d 1288, 1292-94 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988). The state had no occasion to argue either
exception, on appeal or below. Consequently, we are unable to
determine whether either of these exceptions might apply in
this case to some of the evidence which might otherwise have to
be suppressed.
"The independent source doctrine allows admission of
evidence that has been discovered by means wholly independent
of any constitutional violation.- Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S.
431, 443 (1984). Thus, any evidence which was discovered apart
from defendant's statements made during custodial interrogation
need not be excluded.
The inevitable discovery rule allows the admission of
evidence as long as Hthe prosecution can establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately
or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.- Id.
at 444. Sfifi/ M M People v. Freeman. 739 P.2d 856, 860 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1987) (body of deceased victim was so conspicuously
located that discovery was inevitable); State v. Miller. 300
Or. 203, 709 P.2d 225, 242-43 (1985) (hotel maid would
inevitably have discovered body of deceased victim within 56
hours of actual discovery and reported discovery to police),
cert, denied. 475 U.S. 1141 (1986). Under this rule, the
prosecution must show that the evidence HwouldH have been
discovered, not simply that it -could- or -might- have been
discovered. Miller. 709 P.2d at 242. See also United States
v. Romero. 692 F.2d 699, 704 (10th Cir. 1982). It is
altogether unclear from the record before us how much, if any,
of the evidence discovered as a result of the improper
custodial interrogation would inevitably have been discovered.

may be unwelcome, w[t]he fifth amendment exclusionary rule is
clearly dictated by the Constitution and is the only possible
means of protecting the values underlying the privilege against
self-incrimination." M. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith
Exception to the Miranda Rule—A Critigue, 35 Hastings L.J. 429,
466 (1984). We accordingly reverse and remand for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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